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Abstract 
The aim of this piece is to assess whether and to what extent the European Union can be 
considered a world leader in stimulating the development of international climate 
change standards through a variety of international organizations and processes as a 
way of spurring necessary international cooperation. It will argue that given slow 
progress towards an effective global response to the climate change challenge through 
multilateral cooperation, the EU has been trying to develop climate change standards 
internally or in cooperation with third countries, arguably in order to promote the 
acceptance of such standards by the competent international organizations, or at least 
create a critical mass of countries engaging in climate action (minilateralism). The 
paper will conclude by considering the legitimacy issues arising from this multi-faceted 
strategy of the EU in promoting international climate change standards. 
 
Keywords 
Bilateralism; climate change; EU; external action; minilateralism; multilateralism; REDD; 
biodiversity; aviation. 
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Introduction 
 
It is no secret that climate change is considered the most severe contemporary 
environmental challenge, and that it has transcended the realm of global 
environmental policy and law by being gradually conceived as a key threat to global 
security.
1
 The EU has been actively promoting the multilateral recognition of climate 
change as a global environmental and security emergency.
2
 It has also attempted to 
play a global leadership role in the battle against climate change since the early days 
of international cooperation around the issue.
3
 The objective of combatting climate 
change has recently been given also a legal formulation in the Treaty of Lisbon where 
it is listed as one of the objectives of EU environmental policy.
4
 
 
The aim of this piece is to assess whether and to what extent the European Union 
(EU) can be considered a world leader in stimulating the development of international 
climate change standards through a variety of international organizations and 
processes as a way of spurring necessary international cooperation. It will argue that 
given slow progress towards an effective global response to the climate change 
challenge through multilateral cooperation, the EU has been trying to develop climate 
change standards internally or in cooperation with third countries. The key motivation 
has arguably been to promote the acceptance of such standards by the competent 
international organizations, or at least create a critical mass of countries engaging in 
climate action (minilateralism
5
). The paper will conclude by considering the 
legitimacy issues arising from this multi-faceted strategy of the EU in promoting 
international climate change standards. 
                                                        
1 Notably at the 2005 UN World Summit. See discussion in Elisa Morgera “The 2005 UN World 
Summit and the Environment: The Proverbial Half-Full Glass” (2006) 15 Italian Yearbook of 
International Law, 53. More recently, climate change has also become an issue of discussion within the 
UN Security Council: Francesco Sindico, “Climate Change: A Security (Council) Issue?” (2007) 1 
Carbon and Climate Law Review, 26. 
2 Elisa Morgera and Gracia Marín Durán, “The UN 2005 World Summit, the Environment and the EU: 
Priorities, Promises and Prospects” (2006) 15 RECIEL, 1. 
3 Kati Kulovesi, “Climate Change in EU External Relations: Please Follow my Example (or I might 
Force You To)” in Elisa Morgera (ed), The External Environmental Action of the European Union: EU 
and International Law Perspectives (CUP, 2012). 
4 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) [2012] OJ 
C326/47, Article 191(1).  
5 The term is used by Scott Barrett, Why Cooperate? The Incentives to Supply Global Public Goods 
(OUP, 2007). It has also been discussed in Kati Kulovesi, “Addressing Sectoral Emissions outside the 
UNFCCC: What Roles for Multilateralism, Minilateralism and Unilateralism?” (2012) 21 RECIEL, 
193. 
University of Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper No 2013/22 
Page 2 of 20 
 
 
The trajectory of the EU's strategy in promoting international climate change 
standards  
 
 
In keeping with its leadership aspirations, the EU has attempted to use its influence to 
strengthen the multilateral framework for climate change mitigation under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Kyoto 
Protocol.
6
 At the same time, it has sought to lead the global battle against climate 
change ‘by example’ through innovative internal climate policies and legislation.7 
Since the late 1990s, the EU has developed a rather comprehensive body of climate 
change law and policy. The key elements include the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
(ETS) and the 20-20-20 by 2020 goal, in other words, 20%-targets for emission 
reductions, and for increasing energy efficiency and renewable energy by 2020.
8
  
 
Despite efforts by the EU and several others, including developing countries that are 
particularly vulnerable to the negative impacts of climate change, progress made 
under the UNFCCC and other multilateral fora is far from adequate to prevent 
dangerous climate change. The 2°C target (the objective of limiting global average 
temperature increase to 2°C from pre-industrial times) has formed the cornerstone of 
the EU climate policy since 1996, and in 2010, this objective was also formally 
adopted by the 195 Parties to the UNFCCC. The 2°C target is, however, in grave 
danger of slipping out of reach. The UN Environment Programme has estimated that 
there is a gap of six to eleven gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalent between the 
emission reductions required by 2020 to meet the 2°C target, and the emission 
reductions pledged by countries at the inglorious 2009 UN Climate Change 
Conference in Copenhagen.
9
 Continuing with the current climate policies is likely to 
result in global average temperature increase of more than 3°C by the end of the 
century,
10
 estimated to bring about severe environmental, economic, social and 
security consequences.  
 
Given inadequate progress through multilateral cooperation over the past two 
decades, the EU is increasingly attempting to influence external developments and 
global climate policy through its internal legislation.
 11
 In other words, the EU has 
begun crafting its legislation in such a way that aims to promote the development of 
international climate change standards at the multilateral level. In certain cases, the 
EU has also made access to its large and influential market contingent on compliance 
                                                        
6 Kulovesi, “Climate Change in the EU External Relations”, n. 3 above. 
7 Ibid. 
8 The history of these targets has been explained in detail in Kati Kulovesi, Elisa Morgera and Miquel 
Muñoz: “Environmental Integration and Multifaceted International Dimensions of EU Law: Unpacking 
the 2009 Climate and Energy Package” (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review, 829. 
9 UNEP, Bridging the Emissions Gap. A UNEP Synthesis Report (UNEP, 2011), 8. 
10 See ‘The Climate Action Tracker’, an independent science-based assessment, which tracks emissions 
commitments and actions by countries <http://www.climateactiontracker.org/> accessed 07 May 2013. 
11 Scott and Rajamani have characterized the EU’s approach as ‘contingent unilateralism’ in Joanne 
Scott and Lavanya Rajamani, “EU Climate Change Unilateralism” (2012) 23 European Journal of 
International Law, 469. They explain that ‘contingent unilateralism’ includes two elements: “the 
application of EU climate change law to greenhouse gas emissions that are generated abroad” and that 
the “geographical extension contingent in the sense that the EU may agree to waive the external 
application of its climate change law if adequate international or third country climate change 
regulation has been put in place.” Ibid., at 469-470. 
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with its climate standards. In this sense, the EU is using a novel mixture of 
multilateral negotiating positions and internal regulatory approaches that seek to 
export the EU’s approach,12 as well as bilateral and inter-regional cooperation with 
partner countries.
13
  
 
One of the first examples – and a highly controversial one – of the EU’s reliance on 
its internal climate legislation to influence external developments was its decision in 
2008 to include emissions from both domestic and foreign airlines in the EU ETS.
14
 
This was followed by a variety of measures included in the 2009 Climate and Energy 
Package, a comprehensive set of legal acts designed to implement the 20-20-20 by 
2020 targets. Key elements of the Package include a revised ETS Directive, a new 
Directive on all forms of renewable energy (including biofuels),
 
an effort-sharing 
Decision on the Member States’ emissions reductions outside the emissions trading 
sector,
15
 a Directive setting up the legislative framework for carbon capture and 
storage (CCS) and a Regulation seeking to reduce CO2 emissions from passenger 
cars. In early October 2012 the EU also adopted a Directive on energy efficiency to 
complement the package. 
 
As we have argued elsewhere, the 2009 Climate and Energy Package includes many 
innovative elements, some of which also aim to influence developments outside the 
EU.
16
 For example, the revised ETS Directive increased opportunities for the EU to 
try to expand the carbon market by linking the ETS with trading schemes established 
by third countries.
 17
 These changes are in line with the EU’s desire to create a global 
carbon market through interlinked emissions trading schemes. The creation of a 
global carbon market would be important for an effective carbon price signal and for 
reducing the risk of carbon leakage. Revisions to the ETS Directive also contributed 
to the ongoing international debate on climate finance, structured around the 
commitment by developed countries under the UNFCCC to jointly mobilize USD 200 
million of climate finance annually by 2020 from multiple sources. The Package 
contributed to this debate by changing the rules for allocating emission allowances to 
installations participating in the ETS so that auctioning will gradually become the 
main method of allocation. The Directive indicates that the Member States should use 
at least 50% of the auctioning revenues, or an equivalent amount, for activities related 
to climate change mitigation and adaptation within the EU and internationally.
18
 The 
Commission’s original proposal would have introduced a binding obligation to 
earmark auctioning revenues for climate finance, but this was unacceptable for the 
                                                        
12 Hans Vedder, “Diplomacy by Directive: an Analysis of the International Context of the Emissions 
Trading Directive” in Malcolm Evans and Panos Koutrakos (eds), Beyond the Established Legal 
Orders - Policy Interconnections Between the EU and the Rest of the World (Hart, 2011). 
13 Kulovesi, Morgera and Muñoz, n. 8 above.  
14 For comprehensive discussion, see Kati Kulovesi, “Make Your Own Special Song even if Nobody 
Else Sings Along: International Aviation Emissions and the EU Emissions Trading Scheme” (2011) 2 
Climate Law, 535. 
15 Commission, “Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Effort 
of Member States to Reduce Their Greenhouse Gas Emissions to Meet the Community’s Greenhouse 
Gas Emission Reduction Commitments up to 2020” COM (2008) 17. 
16 For comprehensive analysis, Kulovesi, Morgera and Muñoz, n. 8 above.  
17  Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 amending 
Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading 
system of the Community, (2009) OJ L L140/63, Article 25(1)(a). 
18 Ibid., Article 10(3). 
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Member States.
19
 While drafted in non-binding language, the climate finance 
provisions in the ETS Directive represent the first innovative example of how market-
based mechanisms can be used to generate climate funding for both domestic and 
international purposes.  
 
Furthermore, the Package also introduced sustainability criteria for both European and 
imported biofuels to protect high-value biodiversity land and high-value carbon-stock 
land as well as seeking to ensure substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions 
from biofuels. The criteria have thus been unilaterally set by the EU, but were 
expressly based on international reference documents.
20
 Notably, the Directive 
indicates that the EU will endeavour to conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements 
with third countries containing provisions on the sustainability criteria.
21
 
 
The EU has also prominently mainstreamed climate change into the unilateral and 
bilateral tools of its external relations. Specific climate change cooperation clauses 
have been inserted in recent bilateral/inter-regional agreements between the EU and 
its partner countries, containing a commitment to cooperate on trade-related aspects of 
the future international climate change regime.
22
 Financial and technical assistance 
offered by the EU to partner countries also specifically targets various issues related 
to ongoing multilateral negotiations, such as the reform of the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), adaptation, low-emissions development strategies 
and new market mechanisms.
23
 Progress in the long-term climate change negotiations 
has also been addressed through various policy dialogues between the EU and its 
partner countries
24
 and been institutionalised in climate-specific cooperation and 
dialogue initiatives, such as the Global Climate Change Alliance.
25
 Successful 
instances of these dialogues served to agree on specific common priorities between 
the EU and partner countries in anticipation of multilateral environmental negotiations 
sessions.
26
   
 
                                                        
19 See Kulovesi, n. 14 above, at 555. 
20 Directive (EC) 2009/28 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the promotion of the use 
of energy from renewable sources [2009] OJ L140/16 (Renewables Directive), preambular paras. 69, 
73 and 77. 
21
 Ibid., Article 18(4).  
22 E.g. Free Trade Agreement between the EU and its Member States, on one side, and Colombia and 
Peru, on the other[2012] OJ L354/3, (COPE FTA), Article 63, ; Free Trade Agreement between the 
European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part, 6 
October 2010, [2011] OJ L127/4  (South Korea FTA), Article 13.5(3). 
23 Commission, “Environment and Natural Resources Thematic Programme – 2011–2013 Strategy 
Paper and Multiannual Indicative Programme” (ENRTP Strategy 2011–13), 29 October 2010, 9 and 
13. 
24 E.g., Joint Africa-EU Action Plan 2011-2013, Partnership on Climate Change and Environment: 
Third EU-Africa Summit, Joint Africa-EU Strategy Action Plan (2011–2013), Tripoli 30 November 
2010. 
25  See: <www.gcca.eu>. For a discussion, Gracia Marín Durán and Elisa Morgera Environmental 
Integration in the EU's External Relations: Beyond Multilateral Dimensions (Hart, 2012), 229. 
26 E.g., EU-Africa Summit, “First Action Plan (2008–2010) for the Implementation of the Africa-EU 
Strategic Partnership” (undated), para. 8(iii), 
<www.ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/EAS2007_action_plan_2008_2010_en.pdf> 
accessed 07 May 2013; and 12th Africa-EU Ministerial Troika Meeting, “Communiqué” Luxembourg 
28 April 2009, with section Ib, titled “Climate change agenda: preparing the Copenhagen conference”; 
19th EU-Japan Summit, “Joint Press Statement” Tokyo 28 April 2010, para. 12 and Annex, section 2. 
See discussion in Marín Durán and Morgera, n. 25 above, at 231-232. 
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As the above overview shows, climate change has indeed become the most prominent 
example of the EU’s deployment of a vast array of unilateral and bilateral, legal and 
quasi-legal instruments in its external relations to influence multilateral environmental 
standard-setting.
27
 Some of the measures it has adopted seek to provide leadership by 
example and to disseminate information from regulatory innovations, hoping that this 
will be inspire other countries to adopt similar measures in their national legal 
systems. Some climate measures implemented by the EU, however, are mandatory 
and condition market-access to the EU, most notably the aviation scheme.
28
 Others 
can be characterized as something in between, as in the case of the EU biofuels 
sustainability criteria. In this respect, the EU is allowing all biofuels to enter its 
market, but has created disincentives for those that do not respect the EU 
sustainability standards: only biofuels that fulfill the sustainability criteria will be 
counted against the 10% target.
29
   
 
This overview goes to show that the EU has been experimenting with different 
strategies to support the development of global climate change standards. The 
effectiveness of these efforts in terms of promoting global climate change standards 
remains, however, questionable. It is therefore not yet possible to determine which 
approaches may have been more successful than others. It seems therefore useful to 
draw an initial typology of EU approaches in this regard: 
 
Examples of EU 
measures 
Key characteristics International climate 
change standard 
concerned 
ETS  Market mechanism 
 Sanctions 
 Unilateral standard-setting 
 Climate funding 
 Global carbon 
market 
 Sustainability 
standards for carbon 
credits 
 Aviation emissions 
at ICAO 
Biofuels 
sustainability criteria 
 Unilateral standard-setting (based 
on global references) 
 Incentive-based (market) approach 
 Certification (verification?) 
 Dialogue about monitoring 
 CBD and biofuels 
CCS Directive  Unilateral standard setting (based 
on global references) 
 Opportunities for bilateral 
cooperation 
 Inclusion of the CCS 
in the CDM 
FLEGT  Bilateral negotiations 
 standard-setting based on third 
 REDD+ 
 REDD+ safeguards 
                                                        
27 This practice is analysed in detail in Marín Durán and Morgera, n. 25 above. 
28 On this, see Scott and Rajamani, n. 11 above, at 475-476. 
29 There has been some discussion as to whether the biofuels sustainability criteria – targeting 
principally the way in which biofuels entering the EU market rather than the product itself - is 
compatible with the market-access requirements under World Trade Organization (WTO) law. This is 
discussed in Kulovesi, Morgera and Munoz, n. 8 above, at 882-884. 
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country national standards and 
global references 
 Incentive-based (market) approach  
 Involvement of international 
organizations 
under the CBD 
 
 
The EU and support for climate change through multilateralism and 
bi/minilateralism  
 
Our argument here is that it is necessary to assess these efforts against the EU’s 
Treaty-based objective to promote measures at the international level to combat 
climate change,
30
 to promote an international system based on strong multilateral 
environmental cooperation and good global environmental governance, 31  and 
generally to “promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the 
framework of the United Nations.”32 The key question is whether the various mini-
lateral and unilateral strategies deployed by the EU succeed in promoting multilateral 
environmental cooperation and governance, and whether such independent action can 
be deemed as legitimate from the point of view of the international community. In this 
regard, it is necessary in our view to assess the EU’s complex strategy to influence the 
development of international climate change standards from the standpoint of its 
compatibility with general international law and international environmental law. As 
to the latter point, it is necessary to expand the scope of the enquiry to the EU’s 
impacts on various international processes (be they multilateral, bilateral or mini-
lateral) that are directly or indirectly linked to global climate change standard-setting. 
 
First, the EU has actively supported the development of international climate change 
law multilaterally under the UNFCCC. Originally the strongest supporter of the Kyoto 
Protocol among developed countries, it has also consistently advocated a ‘Kyoto-
style’ strong international legal framework, structured around legally-binding 
mitigation commitments and a robust compliance mechanism, in the negotiations 
concerning the long-term future of the UNFCCC regime. Concerning the various 
detailed aspects of climate policy discussed under the UNFCCC, the EU has sought to 
actively provide intellectual input to the process, sharing its experiences and analysis 
on mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology and so on.  
 
Second, the EU is promoting climate-related proposals in various multilateral fora 
outside the UNFCCC. For example, it advocates the adoption of market-based 
measures under both, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) in order to curtail the rapidly growing 
greenhouse gas emissions from international aviation and maritime transport. The EU 
is also promoting safeguards for REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 
and forest Degradation in developing countries; and the role of conservation, 
                                                        
30 Article 191(1) TFEU. 
31 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) [2010] OJ C83/13, 30 March 
2010, Article 21(2)(h) TEU, read in conjunction with the above-mentioned provisions and Article 11 
TFEU on environmental integration (“Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into 
the definition and implementation of the Union policies and activities, in particular with a view to 
promoting sustainable development.”) 
32 Article 21(1), second sentence TEU.  
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sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stock in 
developing countries) and for biofuels in negotiations under the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD), with a view to injecting exogenous standards into the 
international climate change negotiations.
33
  
 
Third, the EU is seeking to promote the expansion and strengthening of climate 
change law through various minilateral and bilateral settings. It is, for example, 
engaged in plans to link its ETS with other emissions trading schemes, including the 
Australian one. The EU has also given financial support, for example, to China to 
develop its domestic emissions trading schemes.
34
 In addition, the EU is providing 
bilateral assistance to developing countries to support their implementation of the 
international climate change regime. Although the overall amount of resources 
allocated to the environmental cooperation by the EU remains modest,
35
 climate 
change receives top priority for cooperation under the 2011-2013 EU environmental 
thematic funding (indicatively allocated €237.5 million, amounting to nearly 47% of 
the total budget),
36
 with emphasis being placed on climate change adaptation
37
 
(including through the Global Climate Change Alliance), climate change mitigation
38
 
(in particular through reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, 
low-emission development strategies, and technology transfer), and promoting 
investments in sustainable energy options.
39
 Another priority area of external funding 
is to strengthen international climate change governance (indicatively allocated €39 
million),
40
 in order for it to be “shaped by the external dimensions of the EU’s climate 
change policies (emphasis added)”.41 This is specifically geared at supporting the 
work of the UNFCCC Secretariat, developing countries’ participation in multilateral 
negotiations; and implementation of and compliance with multilateral environmental 
                                                        
33 The Council of the EU urged, in preparation for the CBD COP 11, “the CBD and its Parties to 
contribute actively to the development and implementation of biodiversity safeguards under REDD+ 3 
as a crucial opportunity for cooperation between the CBD and the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC); and ENCOURAGES the use of indicators and other 
mechanisms to assess the impacts of REDD+ measures on biodiversity.” Council, Conclusions on 
Biological Diversity and Biosafety, 11 June 2012, para. 7, 
<www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/.../130787.pdf> accessed 07 May 2013. 
The REDD+ case is discussed in detail infra. As to biofuels, see Elisa Morgera, “Ambition, Complexity 
and Legitimacy of Pursuing Mutual Supportiveness through the EU's External Environmental Action” 
in Bart Van Vooren, Steven Blockmans, and Jan Wouters (eds), The EU’s Role in Global Governance: 
The Legal Dimension (OUP, 2013), 201-203.  
34  EU-China Summit Press Release, 20 September 2012, 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/132478.pdf> accessed 07 
May 2013. 
35 As recognized by the Commission itself: the yearly average financial commitments by the EU for the 
environment over the period 2007-2010 was around €295 million, representing roughly 4.3% of all EU 
external assistance. European Commission Working Paper, “Improving Environmental Integration in 
Development Cooperation” SEC (2009) 555 final, at 4. See further, Gracia Marín Durán, 
“Environmental Integration in EU Development Cooperation: Responding to International 
Commitments or Its Own Policy Priorities” in Morgera, The External Environmental Policy of the 
European Union, n. 3 above. 
36 ENRTP Strategy 2011-2013, 20-23 and 28. 
37 The indicative allocation for climate change adaptation is €75 million, ENRTP Strategy 2011-2013, 
28. 
38 The indicative allocation for climate change mitigation is €115 million, ENRTP Strategy 2011-2013, 
28. 
39 The indicative allocation for sustainable energy is €47.5 million, ENRTP Strategy 2011-2013, 28. 
40 Ibid., 26 and 28. 
41 Ibid., 25. 
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agreements (MEAs). More recently, the European Commission has proposed to 
establish close interlinkages between climate change, biodiversity and development 
funding, as a pragmatic effort to make the most of high-profile climate finance
42
 
internally and externally,
43
and support ‘climate-proof’ development.44 
 
This paper will focus on two key examples on how the EU tries to promote 
international standards to tackle the global climate change challenge through a variety 
of instruments and in a variety of international fora. The two examples relate 
respectively to the REDD+ and carbon trading. 
 
First case study: REDD+ 
 
Forests currently contribute about one-sixth of global greenhouse gas emissions when 
cleared, overused or degraded, and have the potential to absorb about one-tenth of 
global carbon emissions projected for the first half of this century into their biomass, 
soils and products and store them - in principle in perpetuity.
45 Forests, however, also 
provide several other important environmental and socio-cultural functions that have 
dominated the international debate on sustainable forest management since the 1992 
Rio Summit on the Environment and Development.
46
 Sustainable forest management 
has been a long-standing international concern for the EU and, as such, the EU has 
supported addressing at the multilateral level through the development of a legally 
binding agreement on forests
47
 both at the global
48
 and regional levels.
49
 At the 
unilateral and bilateral levels, the EU has provided early and consistent external 
funding for the protection of tropical forests.
50
 
 
                                                        
42 Ibid., 17. This paragraph summarizes relevant findings on EU external funding of Marín Durán and 
Morgera, n. 25 above, Ch. 4. 
43 See generally, Kulovesi, Morgera and Muñoz, n. 8 above. 
44 Commission, “Green Paper on EU development policy in support of inclusive growth and 
sustainable development – increasing the impact of EU development policy” COM (2010) 629 final, 
17. 
45  FAO, “Role of Forests in Climate Change” (undated) 
<http://www.fao.org/forestry/climatechange/53459/en/> accessed 07 May 2013. 
46 Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the 
Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of all Types of Forests (Forest Principles), 
31 ILM 881 (1992). 
47  Gunilla Reischel, “The EU and the UN Forest Negotiations: A Case of Failed International 
Environmental Governance?” (Marie Curie European Summer School on Earth System Governance, 
Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, 24 May- 6 June 2007) 
<www.2007amsterdamconference.org/Downloads/07SummerSchool%20-%20Reischl.pdf> accessed 
07 May 2013. 
48 The EU advocated the development of a global, legally binding instrument on forests at the United 
Nations Forum on Forests, e.g. Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Summary of the Fifth Session of the 
United Nations Forum on Forests, (2005) Volume 13, No. 133, 4 
<http://www.iisd.ca/forestry/unff/unff5/> accessed 07 May 2013. 
49 During the Forest Europe Ministerial Conference, held in Oslo, Norway, from 14-16 June 2011, 
ministers of European countries and representatives of the EU adopted a mandate for negotiating a 
legally binding agreement on forests in Europe by 2013: see Oslo Ministerial Mandate for Negotiating 
a Legally Binding Agreement on Forests in Europe, 16 June 2011, 
<www.foresteurope2011.org/pop.cfm?FuseAction=Doc&pAction=View&pDocumentId=29800> 
accessed 07 May 2013. 
50 Regulation 2494/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council on Measures to Promote the 
Conservation and Sustainable Management of Tropical Forests and Other Forests in Developing 
Countries [2000] OJ L288/6; DCI Regulation, Articles 6(e) and 7(e) 
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More recently, the EU has sought to promote a global approach to deforestation 
through a combination of EU internal legislation with extraterritorial implications and 
external relations tools. Notably, the EU has been very explicit in linking these efforts 
to its multilateral agenda. At the internal level, the EU has first developed an action 
plan and then enacted a series of regulations to tackle this global problem in the 
immediate term, in the face of limited progress at the global level.
51
 The EU approach 
is based on global soft-law commitments,
52
 and is made clearly compatible with 
ongoing, albeit partial, multilateral efforts.
53
 This approach clearly emphasises the 
ultimate aim of leading to the development of multilateral consensual measures to 
address deforestation by exporter and importer countries, step by step through a 
multilateral instrument or the linking of regional agreements.
54
  
 
Deforestation issues, however, are increasingly addressed under the UNFCCC under 
the so-called REDD+ item.
55
 This international development has led the EU to use its 
external relations to influence those ongoing negotiations. Thus, the EU has included 
references to REDD+ in its recent bilateral agreements
56
 and its 2011-2013 strategy 
for environment thematic funding.
57
 Given that sustainable forest management and 
                                                        
51 Commission, “Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT): Proposal for an Action 
Plan” COM (2003) 251 final, 3 (FLEGT Action Plan). The FLEGT Action Plan was endorsed by the 
Council, “Conclusions - Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT)” [2003] OJ 
C268/1. 
52 World Summit on Sustainable Development, “Johannesburg Plan of Implementation” (4 July 2002) 
UN Doc A/CONF.199/20, Resolution 2, 5. 
53 Namely, timber species listed under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
(Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 3 March 1973, 
993 UNTS 243); see FLEGT Action Plan, 20. The Plan also points to the need to advance work in the 
framework of the UN Security Council to define “conflict timber” as timber traded by armed groups 
and the proceeds of which are used to fund armed conflict, with a view to exploring the possible set-up 
of an international process similar to the Kimberly Process for diamonds. Ibid., 21. 
54 FLEGT Action Plan, 9 and 11. 
55  REDD+ means ‘reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, conservation of 
forest-carbon stocks, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of forest-carbon stocks.’ 
This item was first officially incorporated in the agenda of the multilateral climate change negotiations 
in 2007 (UNFCCC COP, Decision 1/CP.13 “Bali Action Plan” (2008) UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, para. 1(b)(iii); and UNFCCC COP Decision 2/CP.13, “Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation in Developing Countries: Approaches to Stimulate Action” (2008) UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, para. 3, and more recently UNFCCC COP Decision 1/CP.16, “Outcome of 
the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention” 
(2011) UN Doc FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, at III.C: Policy approaches and positive incentives on issues 
relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and 
the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in 
developing countries; and Annexes I-II. For a discussion of legal issues related to REDD+, see Harro 
van Asselt, “Managing the Fragmentation of International Environmental Law: Forests at the 
Intersection of the Climate and Biodiversity Regime” (2012) 44 NYU Journal of International Law and 
Politics, 1205; and Annalisa Savaresi, “Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing 
Countries under the UNFCCC. Caveats and Opportunities for Biodiversity” (2012) 21 Yearbook of 
International Environmental Law 81. 
56 Agreement Establishing an Association between the EU and its Member States, on the one hand, and 
Central America on the other, 22 March 2011, Article 20 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/march/tradoc_147660.pdf> accessed 07 May 2013; COPE 
FTA, Article 286; Partnership Agreement between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
Group of States of the one part and the European Community and its Member States of the other, 
signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, (Cotonou Agreement), Article 32bis 
<http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/overview/documents/devco-cotonou-consol-europe-aid-
2012_en.pdf>, accessed 07 May 2013.  
57 ENRTP Thematic Strategy 2011-2013, 21-22. 
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REDD+ face similar challenges related to participatory approaches to forestry and the 
role of forest-dependent communities, the EU is also considering using lessons learnt 
in the context of its Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) 
initiative
58
 to provide inputs into multilateral negotiations on REDD+.
59
 This would 
include both key concepts related to forest governance emerging from FLEGT 
policies and activities,
60
 as well as the practical insights emerging from the FLEGT 
multi-stakeholder processes leading to the conclusion of forest-specific bilateral 
agreements (called Voluntary Partnership Agreements or VPAs).
61
 This is particularly 
significant as it has proven particularly complex to ensure mutual supportiveness 
between climate change mitigation objectives, on the one hand, and biodiversity 
conservation and respect for the human rights of forest-dwelling communities on the 
other hand
62
 in the multilateral negotiations on REDD+.  
 
What is also noteworthy in the FLEGT initiative is the cooperative approach pursued, 
relying on the forest-related legislation of the exporting country, in the absence of an 
international treaty of reference. This arguably aims to ensure the third country’s 
ownership of the initiative, as well as demonstrate respect for its national sovereignty 
over its forest resources.
63
 This is then coupled with a commitment from the third 
country to review its national legal framework when it does not support sustainable 
forest management,
64
 thus opening the door for a bilateral dialogue on the definition 
of this concept using national legislation of the third country as a departure point.
65
 As 
an incentive for countries to conclude VPAs, a recent EU Regulation establishes a 
presumption of compliance with the due diligence requirement for timber originating 
from a VPA country.
66
 It can therefore be argued that the EU has put in place an 
                                                        
58 FLEGT Action Plan, 3.  
59 For a more detailed discussion, see Annalisa Savaresi, “EU External Action on Forests: FLEGT and 
the Development of International Law” in Morgera, The External Environmental Policy of the 
European Union, n. 3 above. 
60 FLEGT Action Plan, 3 and 5. 
61 The EU 2005 FLEGT Regulation Setting up a Licensing Scheme for Imports of Timber Based on 
Bilateral Agreements (Regulation 2173/2005, [2005] OJ L347/1) called for VPAs to be concluded 
between the EU and timber-exporting third countries. The verification of the legality of harvests of 
timber imported into the EU is to be checked against compliance with the national law of the third 
State ‘as set out in the VPA’ – the latter reference points to a joint evaluation by the third country and 
the EU of the alignment of third-country national forest law with relevant multilateral standards. The 
VPA negotiations notably touch upon all elements of sustainability: they thus emphasize the links 
between disparate pieces of national law that are needed to achieve sustainable forest management on 
the ground. 
62 This relates to the international debate on the so-called ‘safeguards’ for REDD-plus concerning 
biodiversity and forest-dependent communities. Council, “Conclusions on the Convention on 
Biological Diversity: Outcome of and Follow-up to the Nagoya Conference (11-29 October 2010)”, 20 
December 2010, para. 21, where Member States and the Commission are invited to “actively contribute 
to the preparation of advice on the application of relevant safeguards for biodiversity in relation to 
REDD+, in line with the (CBD) COP 10 decision, and facilitate the development and implementation 
of such safeguards under REDD+.” This is already the case for the EU-Africa partnership: e.g. Third 
EU-Africa Summit, “Joint Africa-EU Strategy Action Plan” (2011-2013) Tripoli 30 November 2010, 
51-53. 
63 See Forest Principles, para. 1a. 
64 FLEGT Action Plan, 5. 
65 See for instance, the case of the VPA between the EU and the Republic of Ghana (20 November 
2009) <www.illegal-logging.info/uploads/SignedAgreementECGhanaFLEGTEN.pdf> accessed 07 
May 2013. 
66  Regulation (EU) 995/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council Laying Down the 
Obligations of Operators Who Place Timber and Timber Products on the Market [2010] OJ L295/23, 
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incentive-based approach to joint standard-setting with partner countries.
67
 
 
Significantly, the EU has also involved an independent, specialized international 
organization, namely the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in its FLEGT 
initiative. FAO is managing a global project funded by the EU to support African, 
Caribbean and Pacific countries in the review of their legislation and upgrading of 
their forest governance and law enforcement capacities.
68
 This element is particularly 
significant for the legitimacy and credibility of the EU initiative, due to the fact that 
FAO has a long-standing and well-respected tradition of providing expert and 
independent advice on the reform of national forest laws.
69
 Notably, FAO has recently 
announced that it is exploring synergies between FLEGT and REDD+.
70
 This is 
particularly interesting because the EU appears to involve an intergovernmental 
organization in its bid to influence multilateral standard-setting by linking experience 
on the ground and global negotiations in different fora (notably, the CBD). 
 
On the operational level, it has been underscored that FLEGT and REDD+ face 
similar challenges during their design and implementation phases, such as unclear 
legal frameworks, poor information systems, weak governance, corruption and limited 
capacities.
71
 It has also been reported that interactions between the two processes have 
gradually emerged, although in forms varying from country to country. These 
interactions reportedly concern the stakeholder dialogue at national and local level, 
capacity building, and forest monitoring.
72
 Notably for present purposes interactions 
also include the review of the legal framework done in the context of the FLEGT 
VPA, which may inform national debates on securing REDD+ incentives through 
legal reform and establishing REDD+ safeguards.
73
 
 
Whether FLEGT can effectively provide useful inputs into multilateral negotiations 
on REDD+ remains to be seen, and some commentators have cautioned against 
overestimating FLEGT’s potential to support REDD+ negotiations, particularly 
                                                                                                                                                              
Articles 3-4. The legitimacy of the FLEGT approach was discussed in Morgera, “Ambition, 
Complexity and Legitimacy of Pursuing Mutual Supportiveness through the EU's External 
Environmental Action”, n. 33 above, 203-207. 
67 Morgera, “Ambition, Complexity and Legitimacy of Pursuing Mutual Supportiveness through the 
EU's External Environmental Action”, n. 33 above, 207-208. 
68 See <www.fao.org/forestry/acp-flegt/en> accessed 07 May 2013. Note that while there is no formal 
link between the FAO FLEGT Programme and the VPAs, FAO assistance specifically targets countries 
depending on “their level of interest in the FLEGT Action Plan and in negotiating a VPA” through 
support for national and regional FLEGT/VPA workshops to share information, knowledge and lessons 
learnt, feasibility studies on VPA-related issues; and support for national multi-stakeholder committees 
in charge of VPA negotiations and for the participation of local stakeholders: FAO, Improving Forest 
Governance in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (undated) 6 and 9, 
<foris.fao.org/static/data/acpflegt/4087ForestGovernance EN.pdf > accessed 07 May 2013. 
69  See FAO Legal Office, “Legal Advisory Services: Forestry and Wildlife”, at 
<http://www.fao.org/legal/development-law/forestry-wildlife-and-national-parks/en/> accessed 07 May 
2013. 
70  Earth Negotiations Bulletin, CBD COP 11 Highlights, Volume 09, No. 587, 10 October 2012, 
<http://www.iisd.ca/vol09/enb09587e.html> accessed 07 May 2013. 
71 Valérie Merckx, Christophe Van Orshoven and Alessandro Trevisan, “FLEGT et REDD+: 
Interactions and Challenges” presentation at the Second EU REDD+ Projects Coordination Meeting, 3-
4 July 2012, Brussels, Belgium, <http://www.efi.int/files/attachments/euredd/120703_redd_and_flegt_-
_interaction_and_challenges.pdf> accessed 07 May 2013. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
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because of the different focus of the two processes and risk of the duplication of 
efforts.
74
 While both FLEGT and REDD+ support governance reforms and include 
some forms of compliance verification, REDD+ has a broader scope of action to 
comprehensively tackle forest loss in the tropics by addressing not only deforestation 
caused by illegal timber trade, but also forest loss caused by agricultural expansion, 
mining or domestic demand for fuel-wood.
75
 Nonetheless, REDD+ processes could 
also benefit from experience accrued through FLEGT-related mechanisms for 
monitoring, reporting and verification, as well as the definition of social safeguards 
(notably related to the human rights of indigenous and local forest-dwellers) that have 
hindered international standard-setting for REDD+ in this area.
76
  
 
Against this background, the EU has actively pursued the development of REDD+ 
safeguards in the context of the CBD, highlighting the need for mutual supportiveness 
between the international climate change and biodiversity regime with regard to 
forests. Notably, the EU not only advocated for the development under the CBD of 
advice on REDD+ safeguards, but also called for the CBD Conference of the Parties 
(COP) to consider means of monitoring and assessing the impacts of REDD+ on 
biodiversity.
77
 In 2012, CBD parties eventually agreed on advice on the application of 
relevant safeguards for biodiversity and the protection of the rights of indigenous and 
local communities to REDD+ activities. Such advice includes spelling out how CBD 
obligations specifically translate in the context of REDD+ activities: for instance, 
prioritizing the use of native communities of species; avoiding invasive alien species 
or developing ecosystem and species vulnerability assessments; and applying the 
ecosystem approach to identify sites of high biodiversity value so as to prioritize their 
conservation.
78
 CBD Parties also recommend that national experience in 
implementing the certain previous CBD guidelines be taken into account, such as on 
forest biodiversity and protected areas,
79
 biodiversity-inclusive impact assessment,
80
 
the ecosystem approach,
81
 the Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines for the 
Sustainable Use of Biodiversity,
82
 the Akwé: Kon Guidelines on cultural, 
                                                        
74 Savaresi, “EU External Action on Forests”, n. 59 above. 
75 Ibid. 
76
 Ibid. 
77 Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Summary of the Eleventh Meeting of the Conference of the Parties 
(COP 11) to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Volume 9, No. 595, 22 October 2012, 15, 
<http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb09595e.pdf> accessed 07 May 2013. 
78 CBD Decision XI/19, “Biodiversity and Climate Change Related Issues: Advice on the Application 
of Relevant Safeguards for Biodiversity with Regard to Policy Approaches and Positive Incentives on 
Issues Relating to Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing 
Countries; and the Role of Conservation, Sustainable Management of Forests and Enhancement of 
Forest Carbon Stocks in Developing Countries” (5 December 2012), Annex I. 
79 CBD Decision VI/22, “Expanded Programme of Work on Forest Biological Diversity” (22 May 
2002), Annex; and CBD Decision VII/28, “Programme of Work on Protected Areas” (13 April 2004), 
Annex.  
80 CBD Decision VIII/28, “Voluntary Guidelines on Biodiversity-inclusive Impact Assessment” (15 
June 2006). 
81 Principles of the Ecosystem Approach, in CBD Decision V/6, “Ecosystem Approach” (22 June 
2000), Annex B; and Refinement and Elaboration of the Ecosystem Approach, Based on Assessment of 
Experience of Parties in Implementation, in CBD Decision VII/11 “Ecosystem Approach” (13 April 
2004), Annex I. 
82 Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines for the Sustainable use of Biodiversity, adopted by CBD 
COP Decision VII/12 (13 April 2004), Annex II. 
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environmental and social impact assessments
83
 and the Tkarihwaié:ri Code of Ethical 
Conduct to Ensure Respect for the Cultural and Intellectual Heritage of Indigenous 
and Local Communities.
84
 Furthermore, CBD advice also includes safeguards for the 
full and effective participation of indigenous and local communities in relevant 
policy-making and implementation processes at national and subnational levels, 
considering traditional knowledge, clarifying tenure issues, ensuring an equitable 
distribution of benefits with communities, and sharing responsibility at subnational 
and local levels, including with communities. 
 
Notwithstanding progress under the CBD, the politically sensitive nature of the EU 
proposal should be finally emphasized: negotiations on REDD+ under the CBD 
encountered fierce opposition from certain developing countries Emerging 
economies, in particular, appeared to see through the EU agenda of ensuring “mutual 
supportiveness” between the international biodiversity and climate change regime, an 
attempt to place multilaterally-sanctioned conditionalities to the EU and its Member 
States’ support for REDD+ at the bilateral level.85 These concerns are likely going to 
resurface in multilateral and bilateral contexts where REDD+ safeguards are 
discussed or put in practice. 
 
 
Second case study: the EU efforts to promote, and to set standards for, the 
carbon market 
 
It is argued that creating a price for greenhouse gas emissions would be one of the key 
ways to tackle climate change. According to the Stern Review, for example, “the key 
aim of climate-change policy should be to ensure that those generating greenhouse 
gases… face a marginal cost of emissions that reflects the damage they cause.” 86 As 
the first supranational emissions trading scheme for greenhouse gas emissions, the EU 
ETS constitutes a significant milestone in the evolution of European and global 
climate. In addition to launching the ETS, the EU has also been actively promoting 
carbon trading internationally, seeking to expand the carbon market both through the 
UNFCCC and through interlinked domestic and regional schemes. 
 
While the EU ETS remains the most prominent example of greenhouse gas emissions 
trading, it is useful to bear in mind that it has experienced a number of serious 
challenges since it became operational in 2005. Most notably, setting the emissions 
cap at the right level to create an adequate price signal that effectively promotes low-
carbon investment and innovation is proving to be a considerable challenge for the 
ETS. During the first trading period (2005-2007), the emissions cap was not based on 
monitored data and there was considerable over-allocation. For the second trading 
                                                        
83 Akwé: Kon Voluntary Guidelines for the Conduct of Cultural, Environmental and Social Impact 
Assessment regarding Developments Proposed to Take Place on, or which are Likely to Impact on, 
Sacred Sites and on Lands and Waters Traditionally Occupied or Used by Indigenous and Local 
Communities, in Article 8(j) and related provisions, CBD COP Decision VII/16F (13 April 2004). 
84 CBD Decision X/42 “The Tkarihwaié:ri Code of Ethical Conduct to Ensure Respect for the Cultural 
and Intellectual Heritage of Indigenous and Local Communities” (29 October 2010). 
85 This point was made by Brazil in a contact group on REDD+ at the eleventh meeting of the 
Conference of the Parties to the CBD (October 2012, Hyderabad, India): personal notes on file with 
author Morgera. 
86 Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 353. 
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period (2008-12), the cap was tightened – but at the end of 2011, there was a surplus 
of 950 million allowances due to the unexpectedly dire macroeconomic situation and 
increasing import of international credits.
87
 Given that the banking of allowances 
between trading periods is possible, the use of international credits is allowed and 
emissions have dropped in the ETS sector, a continuous oversupply of allowances 
during most of the third trading period (2013-2020) looks highly likely. This means 
that the ETS is yet again failing to create an effective carbon price signal. The 
European Commission has therefore been exploring possibilities to intervene in the 
carbon market by reviewing the timeline for planned allowance auctions and 
‘backloading’ allowances in order to limit their supply.88 It has also investigated other 
options, such as permanently withholding the necessary amount of allowances
89
 to 
create scarcity in the market. The Commission’s backloading proposal was, however, 
greeted with criticism by the industries covered by the ETS and by some key Member 
States. Also the European Parliament rejected the ‘backloading’ proposal in April 
2013. Discussion about structural changes to the ETS therefore continues. 
 
Lessons learned from the ETS, especially the reasons why the carbon price has 
remained too low, appear as valuable experiences for the EU to disseminate to the 
growing number of countries currently either planning or implementing national or 
sub-national emissions trading schemes, including Australia, Brazil, Chile, China, 
Costa Rica, India, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Republic of Korea and the US.
90   
 
At the same time as it is trying to improve the effectiveness of the ETS internally, the 
EU continues to promote emissions trading through multilateral, minilateral and 
bilateral cooperation. It has made detailed proposals for a sectoral crediting and 
trading mechanism in the ongoing negotiations under the UNFCCC on the New 
Market Mechanisms established by the UNFCCC Parties in at the 2011 UN Climate 
Change Conference in Durban.
91
  As mentioned above, the EU is also negotiating 
with third parties, including Australia, California and Switzerland, for them to link 
their national schemes to the ETS. The European Economic Area (EEA) and 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries (Norway, Liechtenstein and 
Iceland) already participate in the ETS. In its bilateral relations, the EU is giving 
financial support for countries like China that are in the process of developing their 
own trading schemes. 
 
Interestingly, the EU has also taken action in such areas of climate policy where 
multilateral cooperation has been particularly difficult. In other words, the EU has 
tried to influence standard-setting for the international carbon market through its 
internal legislation. Failing to reach a satisfactory solution through multilateral 
negotiations, the EU has adopted internal sustainability standards for carbon credits 
that are stricter than those agreed under the UNFCCC. In concrete terms, the EU has 
                                                        
87 Jos Delbeke, “Is the EU ETS Working? European Commission Perspective”, 26 September 2012, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/docs/2012092801_ets_jd_en.pdf> accessed 07 May 2013. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
90 UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres, “Statement at the Carbon Forum North 
America”, 1 October 2012, available at: 
<http://unfccc.int/files/press/statements/application/pdf/20121001_carbon_forum_north_america.pdf> 
accessed 07 May 2013.  
91  UNFCCC, “Views on the New Market-Based Mechanism. Submissions from Parties” UN Doc 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2012/Misc.6, 11 April 2012, at 7-16. 
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banned credits from afforestation and reforestation activities under the Kyoto 
Protocol’s CDM form the EU ETS. It has also decided to ban credits from 
controversial industrial gas projects under the CDM. From May 2013 onwards, credits 
from projects that involve the destruction of trifluoromethane (HFC-23) and nitrous 
oxide (N2O) are no longer eligible to comply with obligations under the ETS.
92
  
 
Most influential has been, however, the highly controversial decision that the EU took 
in 2008 to include emissions form foreign airlines alongside its internal aviation 
emissions into the ETS starting from 2012.
93
 The question of emissions from 
international aviation and maritime bunker fuels has been debated multilaterally since 
the 1990s under the UNFCCC as well as within the relevant sectoral organizations, 
the ICAO and IMO. For global climate policy, the problem is that emissions from 
aviation and maritime transport are projected to increase manifold by 2050. Their 
growth is eating into the already severely constrained global carbon budget to limit 
the global average temperature increase to 2°C. As discussed above, a gap of 8-11 
gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalent exists between emissions levels in 2020 to meet 
this target and the current climate policies. 
 
After years of unfruitful debates at the UNFCCC, IMO and ICAO, the EU took in 
2008 a decision to include aviation emissions into the ETS from 2012 onwards.
 94
  It 
also decided to draw the boundaries of the scheme in such a way that it applies to all 
flights landing in, and taking off from EU airports. This has been controversial 
internationally given that the scheme also applies to foreign airlines. In fact, the 
independent action by the EU on international aviation emissions has subsequently 
given rise to a boiling international dispute whereby the EU has been accused of, inter 
alia, using unilateral trade measures and exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction in 
violation of international law,
95
 and failing to adequately reflect the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in the design of 
its aviation scheme.
96
 
 
The EU’s emissions trading scheme sets a cap for aviation emissions, calculated on 
the basis of the average of annual emissions in 2004-2006.
97
 Airlines included in the 
scheme must also have in place a system for the annual monitoring and reporting of 
their greenhouse gas emissions.
98
 Emissions are calculated based on the entire flight 
departing from or arriving at an EU airport, including for those parts of the flight that 
take outside the EU airspace. By the end of April each year, airlines included in the 
scheme are supposed to surrender allowances corresponding to their verified 
emissions in the previous year.
99
 Directive 2008/101/EC also contains fairly strict 
                                                        
92 EU Press Release, “Commission Welcomes Vote to Ban Certain Industrial Gas Credits” IP/11/56, 21 
January 2011 < europa.eu/rapid/press-release IP-11-56 en.htm > accessed 07 May 2013. 
93 The following overview of aviation emissions is based on Kulovesi, “Addressing Sectoral Emissions 
outside the UNFCCC: What Roles for Multilateralism, Minilateralism and Unilateralism?” n. 5 above.  
94 Directive 2008/101 of the European Parliament and of the European Council amending Directive 
2003/87 so as to include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance 
trading within the Community, [2009] OJ L8/3.  
95 For an overview of legal arguments in this regard, see Kulovesi, “International Aviation Emissions 
and the EU Emissions Trading Scheme”, n. 14 above. 
96 Scott and Rajamani, n. 11 above. 
97 Directive 2008/101/EC, Articles 3c(1) and (2), Article 3s. 
98 Ibid., Article 3g. 
99 Ibid., Articles 6.2 and 16.3. 
University of Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper No 2013/22 
Page 16 of 20 
 
sanctions for non-compliance with the obligation to surrender emission allowances. 
Accordingly, airlines failing to surrender the required number of emission allowances 
will incur an excess-emissions penalty of €100 for each tonne of carbon dioxide 
(CO2) equivalent emitted for which the airline has not surrendered allowances.
100
 
Such a payment will not release the airline from the obligation to surrender the 
missing allowances. Ultimately, a failure to comply with the Directive may lead to a 
decision by the European Commission that the airline in question is banned from 
operating in the EU.
101
  
 
While the vast majority of foreign airlines complied with their first round of reporting 
obligations, the Commission drew attention to “systematic non-reporting” of their 
2011 emissions by ten commercial airlines based in China (eight) and India (two).
102
 
Such early non-compliance with their ETS obligations by Chinese and Indian airlines 
relates to broader international legal and political opposition to the EU’s decision to 
include foreign airlines into its trading scheme. As a first legal step in the battle 
against the inclusion of aviation emissions in the EU ETS in 2009, American Airlines, 
Continental Airlines, United Airlines and the Air Transport Association of America 
(ATAA) challenged the legality of the scheme’s extraterritorial reach through UK 
courts. This led to a request for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) concerning the validity of Directive 2008/101/EC in light of 
its alleged incompatibility with certain rules and principles of international law, 
namely: 
(a) The principle of customary international law that each state has complete and 
exclusive sovereignty over its air space; 
(b) The principle of customary international law that no state may validly purport to 
subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty; 
(c) The principle of customary international law of freedom to fly over the high seas; 
(d) The principle of customary international law that aircraft overflying the high seas 
are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the country in which they are registered, 
save as expressly provided for by international treaty; 
(e) The Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation (in particular Articles 1, 
11, 12, 15, and 24); 
(f) The Open Skies Agreement (in particular Articles 7, 11.2(c), and 15.3), which is 
an agreement between the United States and the EU and its member states aiming to 
open up air-transport markets; and 
(g) the Kyoto Protocol (in particular, Article 2.2).
103
  
 
In December 2011, the CJEU affirmed the validity of Directive 2008/101/EC, finding 
the Directive’s provisions to be compatible with international law.104 However, the 
outcome failed to satisfy key foreign countries whose airlines are covered by the 
scheme.  
                                                        
100 Ibid., Article 16.3. 
101 Ibid., Articles 16.5-16.12. 
102 European Commission Press Release, “Emissions Trading: Annual Compliance Round-up Shows 
Declining Emissions in 2011”, (IP/12/477) 15 May 2012), 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/12/477> accessed 07 May 2013. 
103  CJEU, Case C-366/10, The Air Transport Association of America, American Airlines, Inc., 
Continental Airlines, Inc., United Airlines, Inc. v The Secretary of State for Energy and Climate 
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A coalition of some 27 countries, including Brazil, China, India, Russia, South Africa 
and the US, then emerged, to oppose the inclusion of international aviation emissions 
in the EU ETS.
105
 Some of them went as far as to adopt internal measures to prevent 
their airlines from complying with the EU scheme. In the US, the ‘European Union 
Emissions Trading Prohibition Act of 2011’ was designed prohibit US-based airlines 
from participating in the ETS. The bill passed the House of Representatives in 
October 2011
106
 and in September 2012, the counterpart bill passed the Senate. As a 
result, the diplomatic conflict between the EU and the US on climate policy reached 
new highs in the autumn of 2012. Also China prohibited its airlines from participating 
in the ETS and increasing fares or imposing other charges as a result of the scheme, 
and India instructed its airlines not to participate in the scheme.
107
  
 
The escalating international row around the ETS resulted in a surprise announcement 
by Connie Hedegaard, European Commissioner for Climate Action in November 
2012. Hedegaard indicated that the EU had decided to “stop the clock” for one year 
on the implementation of the international aspects of aviation under the EU ETS.
108
 In 
practice, this means that the EU will not require allowances to be surrendered in April 
2013 concerning emissions from flights to and from the EU during 2012.
109
 In 2012, 
the aviation scheme will therefore only apply to internal flights within the EU. While 
the Commission’s announcement attempted to justify the move by alluding to positive 
developments at the ICAO and desire to create a positive atmosphere for international 
negotiations, there has been plenty of speculation concerning the ‘real reasons’ behind 
the EU’s decision. For one, key countries do not seem prepared to let go of their 
opposition to a compulsory international market mechanism for aviation emissions.
110
 
Rumors are also ripe that the Commission’s decision to stop the clock was influenced 
more by concerns voiced by powerful EU Member States over the economic 
implications of the scheme than by positive developments at the ICAO.
111
 It will be 
therefore interesting to see what strategy the EU will employ after the one-year 
deadline runs out in the autumn of 2013. 
 
At this stage, the legal and political drama around the EU trading scheme for aviation 
emission goes to show that international standard-setting can be politically highly 
controversial – and very difficult even for powerful players like the EU. Regardless, 
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there are strong legal and environmental justifications for the EU's approach towards 
aviation emissions. Our argument here is that this type of minilateralism could, in 
theory, be useful in advancing multilaterally agreed objectives, including the global 
goal of limiting temperature increase to 2°C – provided that it complies with the 
relevant norms of international law and seeks justification through multilateral fora. 
 
Conclusions: challenges ahead 
 
The EU is a unique actor in the international setting - and it has also devised a 
uniquely complex strategy to support its international climate change standard-setting. 
The reliance by the EU on mini-lateral and bilateral approaches in climate standard-
setting is understandable given that multilateral climate cooperation continues to 
struggle even when urgent measures would be needed to tackle climate change. 
Scientific estimates show that global greenhouse gas emissions must be reduced 
already by 2020 in order to have a reasonable chance of meeting the 2°C target and 
avoiding dangerous anthropogenic climate change,
112
 which are both goals agreed 
multilaterally by the 195 Parties to the UNFCCC. However, as explained above, the 
current measures to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions pledged by countries under the 
UNFCCC are estimated to result in more than 3°C of warming by 2100. The EU’s 
chosen strategy of minilateralism and bilateralism seems justifiable given its objective 
of advancing goals agreed multilaterally under the UNFCCC.  
 
At the same time, however, the EU must be able to respond to criticism that through 
its standard-setting, it unilaterally imposes its own view of international law on third 
countries,
113
 sparks unhealthy regulatory competition,
114
 fails to respect international 
legal principles, such as the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities 
and respective capabilities,
115
 pursues its own competitiveness agenda
116
 or raises 
human rights concerns beyond its borders.
117
 
 
In our view, when assessing the legitimacy and success of the EU as a global leader 
that promotes the development of international climate change standards, the Union’s 
peculiarities as a global environmental actor should be taken into account. First of all, 
the Union’s tendency to establish and institutionalise long-term external governance 
systems, often based on regulatory frameworks detailing common goals and 
participatory guarantees, creates conditions for easily exposing the pursuance of self-
interest as opposed to the EU’s “purported commitment” to partnership and collective 
decision-making.
118
 Second, the EU’s constitutional requirement for coherence in its 
external policy translates into a legal obligation for the Union to “actively pursue” a 
multiplicity of objectives, including environmental protection at different levels, 
human rights and trade liberalisation – all under the overall ambit of contributing to 
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multilateralism.
119
 This makes at the same time the EU’s role in the global fight 
against climate change more ambitious, potentially more balanced but also an easy 
target for criticism arguing that the EU does not respect its own basic rules. 
Furthermore, the special nature of the EU as an international actor whose negotiating 
position is inherently inflexible due to the fact that it is the result of lengthy intra-EU 
negotiations between its 27 Member States,
120
 is further compounded by the 
increasing interaction between internal environmental regulation and external 
relations.
121
 
 
Ultimately, the legitimacy question of the EU’s reliance on minilateralism and 
bilateralism (as opposed to unilateralism) as a constructive and complementary path 
towards international standard-setting on climate change rests on demonstrations of 
good faith. With all its legal peculiarities and unique constraints, the EU still needs to 
show to third countries individually and to the international community as a whole 
that it respects the international legal order and takes into account the reasonable 
expectations of the other members of the international community.
122
 This means 
protecting the reasonable interests of other States that arise from the appearances 
created by the bilateral or minilateral behavior of the EU.
123
 In other words, it implies 
the need for the EU to show trustworthiness and predictability
124
 in how it develops 
and uses its bilateral and minilateral approaches to support multilateralism. It calls for 
the EU to show a “genuine intention to achieve a positive result”125 in supporting 
global climate change standard-setting. Demonstrating good faith, thus, necessitates 
systematic respect for multilateral norms as well as reliance on multilateral 
institutions that are essential to the effective, objective and evenhanded promotion and 
protection of the international community’s interests.126 To this end, the legitimacy of 
EU efforts to influence and support international climate change standard-setting rests 
on continued responsiveness to developments within the multilateral framework, 
including the determinations by multilateral environmental agreements’ governing 
and compliance bodies relating to the link between financial solidarity, capacity 
building, and compliance,
127
 particularly in balancing the use of trade incentives and 
avoiding ‘upsetting’ multilateral determinations of common but differentiated 
responsibilities through bilateral routes.
128
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List of Acronyms 
 
ATAA Air Transport Association of America 
CBD Convention on Biological Diversity 
CCS Carbon Capture and Storage  
CDM Clean Development Mechanism 
CO2  Carbon dioxide 
COP Conference of the Parties 
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union 
EEA European Economic Area 
EFTA European Free Trade Association 
ETS Emissions Trading Scheme 
EU  European Union 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization  
FLEGT Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade 
GHGs Green House Gases 
HFC-23  Trifluoromethane 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 
IMO International Maritime Organization  
MEAs Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
N2O Nitrous Oxide 
REDD+ Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation in 
developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable 
management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stock in 
developing countries 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
VPAs Voluntary Partnership Agreements 
 
 
